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With a wary condescension to Yankee bumptiousness, the British historian 
William Stubbs once suggested that a codification of manorial customs might 
serve to demonstrate 
the continuity of English local institutions from the earliest 
times, to last until our American cousins have annexed us; and 
possibly longer still, for those cousins, even more than most of 
our own countrymen, show a very lively interest in everything, 
legal, customary, or historical, that illustrates the cradle of the 
race, out of which evolution is going to produce the ideal man.l 
This melange of imperial hubris, scientifically gilded idealism, and retrospective 
curiosity is as familiar among Stubbs's late nineteenth-century American con-
temporaries as the irony with which the Englishman treated it. It was served up 
most systematically and appealingly, perhaps, by the New England philosopher 
and historian John Fiske (1842-1901). But Fiske offered more than an odd 
conjunction of high-minded and self-serving ideas. 
Fiske was a "popularizer," as his leading biographer describes him, who 
drew on more original thinkers to fashion an account of history as evolutionary 
progress. Standard treatments have emphasized the conservative outcome of this 
project: beginning as a rebel against religious orthodoxy, Fiske ended by 
constructing a defense of orthodox values based on Spencerian and Darwinian 
precepts.2 But I propose to show that Fiske can also be considered the other way 
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around, as a traditionalist who vitiated tradition. Identifying an anciently-rooted 
"Teutonic Idea" of political development with unlimited Anglo American expan-
sion, he universalized that which took its life from particularities of place and 
time, and discounted those other traditions for which this expansion left no room. 
Fiske consequently shows the traditionalist impulse in late nineteenth-century 
America to have been in no simple way reactionary, but as capable rather of an 
aggressive, characteristically modern, and ultimately self-defeating rendering of 
time as space. 
A native of Connecticut, Fiske graduated from Harvard in 1863. He lectured 
briefly at his Alma Mater and served as assistant librarian at the Harvard College 
Library for seven years, but failed to win a permanent faculty position. Religious 
heterodoxy initially damaged his prospects. While an undergraduate, he had 
abandoned his family's Calvinism—denouncing the Geneva Reformer himself 
as "a sort of incarnation of the Devil he talks about"—and had drawn unfavorable 
notice as a rebel. Without the scholarly discipline which academic affiliation 
could have provided, his thought developed little beyond his youth. Proclaiming 
himself a positivist during his college years, he later abandoned that label and 
settled comfortably into Herbert Spencer's "synthetic," evolutionary philosophy. 
Adapting Spencer to American religious sensibilities, he espoused a "Cosmic 
Theism" which purged Christian doctrines of gross anthropomorphism but 
recognized their essence in the keeping of a deity who was immanent in nature 
and human consciousness, and who worked through evolution to elevate the 
human race from brutality to an eventual reign of peace and altruism.3 
Fiske was a stout, hearty Gilded Age American, uxorious and companion-
able, capable of keen intellectual disputation but confident of the progressive 
resolution of differences and revelation of truth. His personal expansiveness 
fitted well with the Victorian appetite for grand systematizing, which he most 
ambitiously indulged in his Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy (1874). Impelled by 
financial need into a career as a public lecturer, he eventually rendered many of 
his largely historical topics in book form. Works like The Discovery of America, 
The Beginnings of New England, and The Critical Period of American History, 
effectively combined vivid narrative with a clear and edifying interpretive 
scheme, and made Fiske "the best-selling historian of his generation."4 
The reputation as a great man which Fiske enjoyed at his death—on July 4, 
1901—began quickly to erode. The shrinking of Herbert Spencer's stature from 
its Victorian dimensions inevitably contributed to the diminution of that of his 
disciple. Later historians faulted his research methods as insufficiently grounded 
in original sources, and his philosophy, despite its "cosmic" reach, seemed 
increasingly provincial—that of an "ethnic historian" who celebrated the English 
heritage in New England and its achievements in the building of the nation, as 
Milton Berman put it in 1961.5 Most fundamentally, perhaps, his vision of 
progressive social evolution became a casualty of modernist sensibility and 
twentieth-century disillusionment. Yet in his articulation of the themes to which 
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Figure 1: Portrait of John Fiske from The Life and Letters of John Fiske 
by John Spencer Clark, 1917. 
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Bishop Stubbs called sardonic attention, and particularly in his dexterity in 
rendering the traditional virtues of home and community as a summons to 
national expansion, Fiske illuminates a phase of American thought in which a 
retrospective mood ran in tandem with imperial aspirations. 
During Fiske's lifetime, Bronson Alcott' s dictum that Americans possessed 
"the best of time and space" seemed true in as much a dynamic as a static sense.6 
Yet while space was identifiable readily enough with the country's accustomed 
expansionism, time was more problematical. Since the eighteenth century, for 
Americans, it had above all meant progress, and progress meant, purportedly, the 
rejection of the past as a guide for the future. American society like all others 
perpetuated traditions and customs of many kinds, but actual connectedness with 
prior generations was not entirely the point, as James Russell Lowell astutely 
pointed out. "The past has not laid its venerable hands upon us in consecration," 
it seemed to Lowell, "conveying to us that mysterious influence whose force is 
in its continuity."7 The immense space of a "new" continent seemed to cancel any 
debt to time. The most potent traditions of the country, accordingly, conspired 
precisely to denigrate the value of tradition. It counted for nothing in effecting 
the salvation of the Puritan Elect; it fell away before the Jeffersonian sovereignty 
of the present generation; it seemed a hindrance to Franklin's middle-class 
utilitarianism; it was a shoddy vanity to Transcendentalists. "Why should we 
import rags and relics into the new hour?" Emerson asked. "Nature abhors the old. 
Yet innocence of tradition was an aberration, if not of Emerson's "Nature," 
certainly of culture. Even before the Civil War there was a "Party of Memory" as 
well as a "Party of Hope," as R.W.B. Lewis put it; during the half century 
following the war memory—and tradition—came to exercise a far more perva-
sive attraction.9 In the face of actual technological and social change which 
argued a radical discontinuity with the past, a variety of developments reflected 
a yearning for the consolations of tradition: a vogue for genealogy and hereditary 
organizations, a new and more scholarly phase of neo-Gothic architecture, a 
colonial revival, the importation of the British arts and crafts movement, the 
growing popularity of historical novels and pageants, and the emergence of 
historic preservation.10 An expansive spirit shifted readily between space and 
time. Once "eschewed by common consent as the dullest of topics," an Atlantic 
Monthly reviewer noted in 1890, the national history was now being pursued by 
Americans "with the same wholesale ardor with which they have extirpated 
Indians, felled forests, built railroads, crushed rebellion, and populated a conti-
nent."11 
While cheering the progress of their own discipline, historians have empha-
sized the reactive nature of the traditionalist movements of the time: they offered, 
in this view, a sense of stability in the midst of unsettling change, time-hallowed 
certainty in the face of religious or metaphysical doubt, and the reassurance of 
status for those who felt socially besieged by un-WASPish immigrants and 
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upstart millionaires. Some recent work has shown that tradition was not 
necessarily the last refuge of a "dispossessed elite"; it could be a weapon of well-
entrenched social groups in struggles over values and power. Defense of tradition 
could also fall under the description of the "antimodernism" discussed by T.J. 
Jackson Lears as an effort, in common with modernism, to recover authentic 
experience from the desolating rationalization and "overcivilization" of bour-
geois society.12 Neither reactionary nor embattled patrician nor antimodernist, 
Fiske suggests another way in which tradition was employed: not in response to 
perceived deficiencies or uncertainties in society, but as a positive rationale for 
society's continued expansion—as the oracle of empire. 
This use of tradition was, in large measure, considered and deliberate. 
Following tradition was more than ever a self-conscious pursuit in the late 
nineteenth century—a tendency attested to in different ways by the frequent 
"invention of tradition" for political and social purposes, and by the treatment of 
the subject in the developing social sciences.13 Industrialization and urbanization 
fostered a clearer awareness of tradition by casting the differences between 
"traditional" and "modern" ways of life in high relief; imperial encounters with 
non-western peoples made the juxtaposition still more dramatic. Dichotomies 
such as Sir Henry Maine's distinction between status and contract societies and 
Ferdinand Tônnies' antinomy of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft expressed the 
resulting sense of disjunction. Yet there were countercurrents. Evolution, applied 
to society, suggested the continuity of social usages; while anthropologists 
studied the hegemony of tradition in primitive society, sociologists pondered its 
continuing sway even among the most "civilized." Culture, which had once 
connoted the lofty attainments of arts and sciences, of thought and sensibility, 
which liberated humanity from the burden of tradition, was coming to be 
"identified with that very burden," as George Stocking put it.14 
Fiske's views were sufficiently au courant to be shaped by these trends of 
social thought, although he perceived in them no challenge to the hierarchical 
ranking of societies which retained the mantle of orthodoxy during his lifetime. 
Herbert Spencer and other sociologists and historians showed him how tradition 
could be fitted neatly into an overarching plan of progress. In the early stages of 
society, it seemed clear, human beings were necessarily broken to the "yoke of 
tyrannical custom," as Fiske put it; there was no other way to organize men and 
women effectively to cope with their environment.15 Although tyrannical, this 
early rule of custom and tradition made possible a truly human life, one 
distinguished by enduring social relationships which nurtured the growth of 
moral sentiments from generation to generation. In keeping with Spencer's law 
of evolution, moreover, accumulating customs and traditions made the social 
environment increasingly heterogeneous, and this heterogeneity, Fiske thought, 
was "the chief proximate determining cause of social progress."16 For precisely 
this reason the prehistoric invention of tradition had been a decisive event in 
human development. Citing the French philosopher Emile Littré, he pointed out 
that the study of humanity revealed 
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a new phenomenon unknown in biology or in psychology pure 
and simple. That new phenomenon is Tradition, or the be-
queathing of all its organized intellectual and moral experience 
by each generation to its successor. Here for the first time we 
have an environment which is rapidly changing in a definite 
order of sequence, and changing by the very activity of the 
community itself.17 
Although tradition transcended biology, as Fiske pointed out, it is notewor-
thy that the one insight which he claimed as his own original contribution to the 
theory of evolution gave tradition a biological basis. This was Fiske's theory of 
the prolongation of infancy in human beings—a contribution not accorded much 
importance by later investigators, but one which Fiske (on Spencer's assurance) 
regarded as his guarantee of immortality. A long childhood, combined with the 
development of language, increasingly permitted education to supersede mere 
heredity as the means of passing on ancestral experience, Fiske argued. Humanity 
was thus enabled "to accumulate a fund of tradition, which in the fullness of time 
was to bloom forth in history and poetry, in science and theology."18 
Fiske so closely identified tradition with progress as seemingly to reduce 
them to facets of the same grand process of social evolution. He could praise 
Francis Parkman for his unequalled skill in depicting American Indian society in 
"the ancient stages of its progress," and as readily note that when barbarism was 
overwhelmed by civilization "its vanishing is final: the thread of tradition is cut 
off forever with the shears of Fate."19 Although he could contemplate the severing 
of barbarian tradition with fair equanimity, Fiske was a gradualist when it came 
to changes in civilized society, and he adapted Walter Bagehot's famous 
metaphor to bind tradition and progress in a different way: "in a progressive 
society the cementing and breaking of the 'cake of custom' must go on simulta-
neously," he suggested.20 
Yet the breaking, it appeared, never quite kept pace with the cementing. The 
effects of the traditionary were cumulative, and to make the point Fiske availed 
himself of another image from the stock ideas of the century, at once more 
imperial and more somber, and as darkly ironic in its implications for expansion 
as in those for progress. "As Comte expresses it, in one of his profoundest 
aphorisms, the empire of the dead over the living increases from age to age," Fiske 
noted in the Cosmic Philosophy. In the earliest phases of human experience, as 
he explicated Comte, conditions of physical environment were largely determin-
ing; with the advance of civilization "the organized experience of past genera-
tions" was of ever-increasing importance. Consequently, Fiske concluded, "the 
environment of each generation consists to a greater and greater extent of the sum 
total of traditions bequeathed by all past generations."21 
Americans, Fiske included, were in actuality more interested in creating an 
empire of the living than in living in an empire of the dead. Yet the one could 
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authorize the other. Comte's figure suggested a phenomenon noted in Fiske's 
time, as in ours, as a propensity of western thought. "In place of a heterogeneous 
duration whose moments permeate one another," Henri Bergson argued in 1889, 
the need to objectify and measure had elicited "a homogeneous time whose 
moments are strung on a spatial line." Richard J. Quinones has recently drawn 
on Bergson to explain the character of numbing uniformity which historical 
schemes of progress and evolution assumed for twentieth-century modernists: 
"when the predictive, controlling aspect of time triumphed in the late nineteenth 
century, and triumphed so thoroughly and one-sidedly, it paradoxically produced 
its opposite effect, the triumph of space. Predictive time, without innovation or 
simple freshness of human appeal, leads to a kind of repetitive sameness "22 
In nineteenth-century America, space and time could be antitheses, espe-
cially when time was considered retrospectively. "The thinking American," 
Stephen Spender observed, "was divided between history—his roots within the 
English and European tradition—and geography—the immensity of America 
and the sense of his own being expanding to embrace that immensity." Space to 
expand could compensate for paucity of tradition.23 Yet the "homogeneous," 
measured time of which Bergson wrote would have meant to Americans the 
more-or-less smooth course of progress which was an article of national faith. 
This kind of time positively summoned Americans to expansion. Insofar as 
Americans perceived their continent as "empty"—leaving its aboriginal inhabit-
ants out of account—the space to be traversed and consumed was from a human 
standpoint equally homogeneous. The frontier line could advance with as much 
temporal and spatial evenness as inevitable natural and historical contingencies 
would permit. With this formulation the purely progressive side of Fiske's 
scheme of history was well in accord. 
This mode of spatialization, however, seemed to have little to do with 
tradition, the affinities of which have long been recognized as being with place 
rather than space—with the definite rather than the abstract. As Sir Walter Scott 
put it, "tradition depends upon locality." This was a problem for American 
traditionalists. George Perkins Marsh early encapsulated the withering effect 
upon tradition of the mobility so central to the national experience: "antiquity, and 
the reverence with which it is regarded, necessarily partake of a local character, 
and an emigrating people leaves behind it, with the localities, the associations and 
the traditions upon which that reverence is founded," he observed in 1843.24 And 
when locality yields to a space which is everywhere and nowhere, it will not be 
surprising if the lumpy specificity of tradition resolves itself accordingly into a 
smooth and abstract time. The future is readily perceived as progress, but the past 
either becomes alien—a "foreign country"—or is subsumed by the timeless— 
consequences familiar enough among ahistorical Americans. 
Fiske, despite the "cosmic" abstractions of his evolutionary philosophy, was 
unwilling to jettison the traditions of place and home, and his real project was to 
find a way in which they might be generalized. With him as with many Victorians 
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domesticity comported easily with empire—and even with cosmos. He was a 
man for whom it was axiomatic that an acceptable afterlife was unimaginable 
"without the continuance of the tender household affections which alone make 
the present life worth living. . . ." In The Idea of God as Affected by Modern-
Knowledge (1885), he more graphically linked home with eternity: "as in the 
roaring loom of Time the endless web of events is woven, each strand shall make 
more and more clearly visible the living garment of God."25 Associated tradition-
ally with hearthside labor and cottage industry, the loom became the emblem here 
of a universal design. Processing yarn or thread into an expanse of cloth with the 
forward motion imparted by the machine, it represented as components of that 
design both linear progress and the translation of time into space as suggested by 
Bergson. 
An expansive view of domestic and community usages, if not the grand 
teleology to which Fiske gave expression, is familiar among historians of the 
time. William B. Weeden perhaps best articulated the theme in his Economic and 
Social History of New England, 1620-1789 (1890), when he remarked upon the 
Anglo American "power of carrying the home outward." By the time of the Civil 
War this social and political vitality had enabled the American people, "having 
burst the swaddling clothes of local government," to grow "into imperial 
government," Weeden elaborated. Lois Kimball Mathews' The Expansion of 
New England (1909), although published after Fiske's death, provides a good 
example of the further development of the theme in its tracing of the march of 
Yankee institutions—church, school and town-meeting—from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific. "Wherever Puritan blood has gone, Puritan traditions have been carried," 
was Mathews' succinct conclusion.26 
Such formulations would no doubt have added to Bishop Stubbs's amuse-
ment at the American facility in combining the themes of local tradition with 
those of evolutionary progress and expansion, but it was largely Stubbs himself 
and other of the later British "Whig" historians who supplied the rationale. "Ideas 
of progress and the Burkean conception of tradition" were the "warp and woof 
of Whig history, as J.W. Burrow put it.27 The Whigs were concerned particularly 
to trace modern national polities to their ancient and local roots. Fiske was among 
the historians instructed by Sir Henry Maine's Village-Communities in the East 
and West (1889). Although customary and traditional to an oppressive degree, 
the primitive "mark community" (the village with its common land) harbored also 
a democratic impulse, Maine thought. In the village council in particular, as he 
elsewhere explained, lay the "embryo" of Parliament and other Anglo American 
legislative bodies.28 
Other scholars were more sanguine about the early uses of tradition than the 
individualistic Maine. Among these Fiske found Edward A. Freeman particu-
larly congenial—both as an historian and as a "very lovable" friend. Like Fiske, 
Freeman believed firmly in the congruence of progress with custom and tradition. 
"Let ancient customs prevail; let us ever stand fast in the old paths," he urged. "But 
the old paths have in England ever been the paths of progress . . . ." The 
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Englishman's insistence on the long continuity of Anglo American history—he 
regarded the United States as a third England, after the original Anglo-Saxon 
home on the European mainland and "Middle England" in Britain—gratified 
both Fiske's Anglophilia and his faith in social evolution. Freeman's conviction 
that national history was made up largely of local history, and his interest in 
federalism as the means of expanding the sphere of the political community, also 
suited Fiske's purposes.29 Above all, perhaps, Freeman offered a British valida-
tion of both American tradition and American expansion. 
Pursuing these master themes, Fiske depicted America as a modified but 
greater England, the product of an unfolding progressive transatlantic tradition. 
Notions of the country as a new beginning were wholly set aside; those traditions 
most deeply rooted in English history usually turned out to be the ones which had 
best served the cause of liberty, and which had therefore best flourished in 
America. Preeminent were those associated with that much idealized commu-
nity, the New England town, and with its equally idealized town-meeting. Fiske 
took rare and mild exception to Freeman in insisting that the Swiss cantonal 
assemblies, which had enraptured the English historian as pure survivals of 
Germanic democracy, were no more venerable or egalitarian than their New 
England counterparts—even if they were held in the open air and attended by a 
pageantry eschewed by austere Yankees.30 
The town community—venerable with tradition, pregnant with empire— 
was for Fiske the "home" which was to be "carried outward." He described 
Cambridge, Massachusetts as the product of "a rich inheritance" encompassing 
not only traces of the primordial "mark community" but classical and medieval 
traditions of law and scholarship associated with the town's English namesake. 
An address in 1900 commemorating the two-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of 
the founding of Middletown, Connecticut, in which he had grown up, occasioned 
a more sentimental encomium upon the "sweet domesticity of the old New 
England," as well as a reminder of the seminal role of the town-meeting in 
creating the American democracy.31 Although such sentiments reflected the 
Yankee tendency to see America as New England writ large, Fiske insisted that 
"something very like the 'town-meeting principle' lies at the bottom of all the 
political life of the United States." He found analogies to the town-meeting in the 
courts of early Maryland manors and the elected vestries of South Carolina 
parishes. Virginia institutions were more difficult to assimilate to the town 
principle, but Fiske could at least enlist Thomas Jefferson in testimony that "the 
town meeting is the best form of government ever devised by man."32 
No matter how impressive the institutions of local self-government, Fiske 
believed that the ultimate problem of political history had been to find a way of 
combining them with the greater security and concert of efforts made possible by 
large-scale organization. The solution, upon which he elaborated in The Begin-
nings of New England (1889), had been found in the "Teutonic Idea of political 
life" which it had been preeminently the work of New Englanders to bear to 
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America and nurture on the new continent.33 Despite its racial overtones, the 
Teutonic Idea was essentially a political tradition, inhering not only in ideas, but 
in beliefs, values, laws, customs and institutions which the historian ascribed to 
the Germanic and especially the English peoples. It was for Fiske the paramount 
tradition of western political development because it provided the nexus between 
tradition and expansion, between community and empire. 
The Teutonic Idea represented the highest phase of statecraft. In Fiske's 
analysis, the "Oriental" method of nation-building had been one of "conquest 
without incorporation." The Roman method had provided for incorporation, but 
not for representation. It had been the Teutonic genius to follow expansion with 
both incorporation and representation, making it possible to achieve "national 
unity on a grand scale, without weakening the sense of personal and local 
independence." Although the struggle between centralizing and localizing forces 
had been a general one in Europe, it was only in England, Fiske thought, that the 
representative principle had been fully established, and it was there that local 
independence had been most effectively preserved. But the problem was a 
continuing one. "From the days of Arminius and Civilis in the wilds of lower 
Germany to the days of Franklin and Jefferson in Independence Hall, we have 
been engaged in this struggle," he observed.34 
The continuity of the struggle was unbroken; Fiske explained the apparent 
American discontinuities of emigration and revolution by making such breaks 
with the past themselves traditional—the habits of a wandering and freedom-
loving race—and further through his perception that the circumstances of 
emigration had resulted in a distillation and strengthening of salient national 
traits. The ancient "Aryan" invaders of Europe had been "the pioneers or Yankees 
of prehistoric antiquity," he suggested, in whom changing circumstances had 
fostered resourcefulness and flexibility. The later Anglo-Saxon migration to 
Britain and the still later British migration to America had accentuated these 
qualities. The Atlantic Ocean served as a wider English channel, a shield against 
foreign despotism which obviated the need for a domestic one. Consequently, 
English traditions of liberty had taken ready root, and were given new scope by 
the vast reaches of the continent.35 
A favorable environment had enabled Americans to perfect a principle which 
was embryonic in English and Germanic modes of political organization, and 
thereby to supply the capstone of the "Teutonic Idea." This was the federal 
principle of government. Federalism was for Fiske no mere expedient; its 
significance transcended any mechanical division of powers between states and 
a general government. It served almost as a political philosophers' stone in its 
mediation between the local and traditional on the one hand and the extended and 
modern on the other, in its efficacy in transmuting time into space. 
Federalism in this sense was a natural product of social evolution, of the 
progressive "integration of communities, originally mere tribes or clans, into 
social aggregates of higher and higher orders of complexity."36 Conflating 
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federalism in the usual sense with representation in county courts and Parliament, 
Fiske described the historical evolution of the English state as a sort of cellular 
construction of small units into large. Thus village-communities made up the 
shire, and the kingdom was composed of a union of shires. Full germination of 
the federal principle required, however, abundance of space as well as of time: 
"first, a vast extent of unoccupied country which could be settled without much 
warfare by men of the same race and speech, and secondly, on the part of the 
settlers, a rich inheritance of political training such as is afforded by long ages of 
self-government." These, of course, were precisely the advantages which Ameri-
cans enjoyed. Fiske pointed with particular pride to the pivotal role of his native 
state. Connecticut's colonial system of electing its governor and council by a 
majority of the voters, while towns were represented equally in one house of the 
legislature, had created a kind of "tiny federal republic," he argued. It had also 
provided a broad precedent for the "Connecticut Compromise" at the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787—an accommodation enabling the United States to 
combine "imperial vastness with unhampered local self-government."37 
Fiske was confident that the political genius which had inspired the Con-
necticut Compromise was not yet exhausted. Vindicated and strengthened by the 
Union triumph in the Civil War, the federal principle seemed poised to give the 
Teutonic Idea "a hundred fold power and seminal influence in the future work of 
the world." A federated Europe, and even an eventual world federal union, 
appeared as reasonable prospects in this great unfolding. Globalized, the tradi-
tions of the English village and the New England town would construct a 
peaceful, "truly Christian," world.38 
This vision, of course, was only provincialism universalized. Fiske had 
noted the advantages of flexibility which an American federal union offered in 
bringing into comity states so diverse as Maine, Louisiana, and California.39 Yet 
the accent was on commonality, of race and of political tradition. That accent 
became even more pronounced when Fiske sought to project the federal principle 
beyond national bounds. He proposed his world federation in a lecture appropri-
ately entitled "Manifest Destiny," delivered at Boston in 1879 and published 
unchanged six years later. He left no doubt as to the cultural and even the 
biological provenance of such a federation. The contemporary vigor of the 
English-speaking peoples seemed to him ample indication that 
the work which the English race began when it colonized North 
America is destined to go on until every land on the earth's 
surface that is not already the seat of an old civilization shall 
become English in its language, in its political habits and 
traditions, and to a predominant extent in the blood of its 
people. The day is at hand when four-fifths of the human race 
will trace its pedigree to English forefathers, as four-fifths of 
the white people in the United States trace their pedigree to-
day.40 
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Clearly the federation which was to preside over a future so envisioned 
would represent the triumph of one very particular tradition. Absent here are other 
traditions except for the implied concession that a non-English "old civilization" 
might be permitted its residual existence. The ideal world union seems hardly to 
conceal a heady mixture of imperialism and racism. Actually these terms cannot 
be applied to Fiske without serious qualification. Although entirely aware of the 
role of force in the growth of the British Empire and the American republic, he 
attributed the success of those polities fundamentally to superior Anglo American 
political traditions and organizing principles, and assumed that the future enlarge-
ment of their sway would be benevolent and pacific. He was consequently 
dismayed by the war with Spain in 1898, although he was persuaded to endorse 
the annexation of the Philippines after initial opposition. Contrary to hard-core 
nativists, he believed American society capable of assimilating any particular 
race. The latter term was problematic; for Fiske as for many of his contemporar-
ies, "race" hovered uncertainly in meaning between biological and cultural 
categories. He accepted easily enough the conventions of the time which used 
such terms as "Teutonic" and "Aryan" to denote "dominant races" and to explain 
historical development (although he preferred "English" to the ubiquitous "Anglo-
Saxon"). Yet he knew that there were no "pure races" on any large scale, and no 
necessary correlation of race with social advancement. He warned as early as 
1876 of "the fallaciousness of explaining all national peculiarities by a cheap 
reference to 'blood' . . . ."4l 
Fiske falls short of later standards of tolerance and pluralism less because he 
was touched by racism and jingoism than because he subordinated considerations 
of culture, tradition, and race alike to a unitary scheme of progressive social 
evolution. Relying on anthropologists like Louis Henry Morgan, Fiske accepted 
the view that human culture advanced toward higher levels of civilization by 
passing through universal stages of development. Consequently, one might 
observe among the Iroquois customs and beliefs characteristic of the early 
Greeks, for example; Fiske noted with remarkable exactitude that the inhabitants 
of the Aegean region by ca. 6000 B.C.E. had reached a stage of development 
which it had taken the North American Indians until ca. 1700 C.E. to attain.42 
The theory of universal stages of development did not logically entail racism 
in any strict biological sense, and might even imply a racial equality: a people 
detained in its ascension of the great developmental ladder by adventitious factors 
or adverse environmental circumstances might in the normal course of social 
evolution expect to make its way up. Fiske gave point to his comparison of the 
Iroquois with prehistoric Europeans by arguing that Indians were eminently 
capable of "learning civilization."43 But the linear scale of development accentu-
ated perceived inequalities of culture, and submerged the integrity of particular 
traditions in a preconceived plan of progress. It would be difficult to rescue Fiske 
from Edward Said's strictures upon the "Eurocentric culture" which "relentlessly 
codified and observed everything about the non-European or peripheral world," 
with the limits of understanding which such a project entailed.44 
The Empire of the Dead and the Empire of the Living 103 
On the American continents, where the Teutonic Idea entered upon its 
culminating phase of social expansion, surviving Indians might "learn civiliza-
tion" and in this way accelerate their social progress, but native traditions which 
the prescribed course of ascent could not accommodate were readily severed by 
the "shears of Fate." Fiske did not contemplate this development with any lack 
of interest, or even of sympathy. In what was probably his most impressive and 
successful work of history, The Discovery of America (1892), he devoted 
considerable attention to the Native American cultures. His interests derived in 
the first instance from the assumption that these societies could throw light on 
those of the West at an equivalent stage of development, but he was clearly 
impressed by the brilliant arts and urban amenities of the Aztecs and the 
attainments in social and political organization of the Incas. He acknowledged 
that the Spanish conquest of Mexico and Peru had had no more of right or morality 
about it than the springing of the "lion . . . upon his prey," and he decried—with 
a certain Anglo American righteousness—the heinousness of Spanish methods of 
empire-building.45 
Yet in their encounter with indigenous American cultures the Spanish had 
after all represented civilization, whereas according to Morgan's classification 
even the Aztecs and Incas had never risen above the middle level of barbarism. 
When "two grades of culture so widely severed" came into contact, the destruc-
tion of the lesser was to be expected, and Fiske could not feel that this was truly 
to be regretted. Even the Spanish Inquisition was preferable to the human 
sacrifices of the Aztecs, and the Spanish use of torture more palatable than the 
Native American. At least the Inquisition tortured with a moral purpose in view; 
this seemed to Fiske—innocent of the dedicated cruelties of the twentieth 
century—somewhat less repugnant than "wanton" Indian atrocities.46 
However the moral scales were to be balanced between conquerors and 
conquered, the extirpation of peoples and traditions which Fiske described 
suggests to the present-day reader a different and grimmer meaning for the phrase 
"empire of the dead" than that which Auguste Comte intended. Within the new 
empires of the living—Spanish or English—there was little chance of the 
coexistence of largely incommensurate traditions—as incommensurate, perhaps, 
in their cruelties as in their virtues. Not even the federal principle, efficacious 
among Connecticut towns or the states of the Union, could guarantee comity 
among such differing cultures. 
A strictly linear scheme of social development, especially when it issued in 
the spatialized form of imperial expansion, almost precluded such comity. It also 
distorted the nature of tradition, as it had previously been understood. For earlier 
defenders of tradition such as Edmund Burke, the traditional had had a particu-
laristic and motley quality; for them, indeed, its very value to the accumulation 
of human experience arose from its lack of assimilability to any abstract or 
universalizing principle. Burke's celebrated "little platoons" of men could 
encompass the domestic and community felicities which Fiske defended, but 
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hardly such a hypertrophy of tradition as the "Teutonic Idea" with which he tried 
to give these felicities universal scope. 
By the time of Fiske's death, tradition subsumed in a scheme of progressive 
evolution was coming to seem as constraining in its way as tradition understood 
as a purely static phenomenon had seemed to the American "Party of Hope." 
Franz Boas and other anthropologists abandoned the theory of universal stages of 
development even as they affirmed the necessary functional role of tradition. 
Modernists resolved to break up the sheer continuity of nineteenth-century time 
to permit the timeless to impinge upon everyday experience; they rejected as well 
the spatial expression of that continuity. "Was not Modernism . . . an attempt to 
put a brake on the linear movement of the will toward simple expansion?" 
Quinones asks.47 
Since Fiske's time exponents of tradition have been inclined to view it as a 
defense precisely against the tyranny of the narrowly progressive, the universal-
izing, and the mindlessly expansive—against "empire" of either the living or the 
dead. During the first half of the twentieth century it retreated from its imperial 
dimensions into such spatial embodiments as Josiah Royce's "province," Ralph 
Adams Cram's "walled town," and the yeoman's farm of the Southern Agrarians. 
Like such more tangible reservations of memory as Colonial Williamsburg and 
Old Sturbridge Village, these formulations attempted to restore to tradition its 
proper specificity of place. 
The ascription to tradition of an imperial destiny was simply a corollary of 
overreaching moral and epistemic claims. Like Burke, some recent thinkers have 
found rather that the value of tradition is intimately connected to its limitations. 
Alasdair Maclntyre, for instance, contrasts tradition as a version of moral inquiry 
arising from "membership in a particular type of moral community" with the 
"encyclopaedist" conception of truth as universal and disinterested, as well as 
with the "genealogical" dismissal of reason as a mask for interests in their quest 
for power. A tradition so conceived may grow by transcending itself and 
extending its reach, but has no need to imperialize or condescend.48 
John Fiske was a model "encyclopaedist" both in the range of his interests 
and in his confidence in a universal truth. Yet with his vision fixed on the "ideal 
man" toward which evolution—via Anglo American tradition—tended, he 
shared the encyclopaedist inability, as Maclntyre describes it, to "enter imagina-
tively into the standpoint of those allegedly primitive and savage peoples" who 
stood in the way of this consummation.49 But ultimately Fiske required even such 
advanced products of social evolution as the Chinese or the French to bend to the 
"Teutonic" standard. To spatialize a tradition, it seemed, was not only to extend 
its dominion, but to flatten the variegated landscape in which traditions can 
endure and flourish. 
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